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Nissim, a 64 years old Hebrew-speaking man who sustained an ischemic infarct in the left
occipital lobe, exhibited an intriguing pattern. He could hold a deep and fluent conversation
about abstract and complex issues, such as the social risks in unemployment, but failed
to retrieve imageable words such as ball, spoon, carrot, or giraffe. A detailed study of the
words he could and could not retrieve, in tasks of picture naming, tactile naming, and
naming to definition, indicated that whereas he was able to retrieve abstract words, he
had severe difficulties when trying to retrieve imageable words. The same dissociation
also applied for proper names—he could retrieve names of people who have no visual
image attached to their representation (such as the son of the biblical Abraham), but
could not name people who had a visual image (such as his own son, or Barack Obama).
When he tried to produce imageable words, he mainly produced perseverations and
empty speech, and some semantic paraphasias. He did not produce perseverations
when he tried to retrieve abstract words. This suggests that perseverations may occur
when the phonological production system produces a word without proper activation
in the semantic lexicon. Nissim evinced a similar dissociation in comprehension—he
could understand abstract words and sentences but failed to understand sentences with
imageable words, and to match spoken imageable words to pictures or to semantically
related imageable words. He was able to understand proverbs with imageable literal
meaning but abstract figurative meaning. His comprehension was impaired also in tasks
of semantic associations of pictures, pointing to a conceptual, rather than lexical source of
the deficit. His visual perception as well as his phonological input and output lexicons and
buffers (assessed by auditory lexical decision, word and sentence repetition, and writing
to dictation) were intact, supporting a selective conceptual system impairment. He was
able to retrieve gestures for objects and pictures he saw, indicating that his access to
concepts often sufficed for the activation of the motoric information but did not suffice for
access to the entry in the semantic lexicon. These results show that imageable concepts
can be selectively impaired, and shed light on the organization of conceptual-semantic
system.
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INTRODUCTION
When a neuropsychologist uses the term “imageability effect” we
usually understand that imageable words are better than abstract
ones. Indeed, most studies that report an effect of imageability
on naming in aphasia present individuals who name image-
able target words more accurately than abstract ones. This can
already offer some insight into the organization of the conceptual-
semantic system. In the current study we examined in detail the
opposite effect: we report on Nissim, a 64 years old man who
sustained a left occipital stroke, who had good naming and com-
prehension of abstract words and concepts and impaired access
to words and concepts that have visual attributes. A line of tests
that we report below shows that Nissim had a selective impair-
ment in the conceptual system that did not allow him to fully
process concepts that have visual properties. This in turn did not
allow him to go from a concept that has visual attributes to the
lexical item, or to access such concepts from the semantic lexicon.
Such dissociation, in which words and concepts that have visual
attributes are impaired, alongside good access to abstract words
and concepts, can be informative about the organization of the
conceptual-semantic system.
The more frequently witnessed dissociation is the one in which
the performance on concrete words is better than that of abstract
words. Such pattern was reported in various papers. For exam-
ple, Nickels and Howard (1995) showed an imageability effect in
naming in three aphasic patients, as well as at the group level
for 15 individuals with aphasia. Whereas Nickels and Howard
made a distinction between concreteness and imageability, they
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suggested (as did Franklin et al., 1995), that both imageability
and concreteness might assist naming by richness of semantic
representation (rather than by the accessibility to sensory expe-
rience or imageability per se). Franklin et al. (1995) reported on
the case of DRB, who showed specific difficulty in the retrieval of
abstract words. Additional discussions of the imageability effect
and reports of aphasic patients who showed significant image-
ability effect, with better performance on high imageability words
compared to low imageability words were reported by Franklin
(1989); Nickels (1995); Tyler and Moss (1997); Bird et al. (2000);
Luzzatti et al. (2002); Crepaldi et al. (2006, 2012), and others.
This effect was also found for semantic dementia (SD) and
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients. For example, Jefferies et al.
(2009) examined synonym judgment of high and low imageabil-
ity words (in fact, they were looking to see whether a reversed
imageability effect characterizes semantic dementia). They tested
11 patients with semantic dementia and found only the com-
mon effect, with better comprehension of imageable words than
abstract ones. Yi et al. (2007) studied naming to definition in
semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, and found the same
direction of dissociation: both naming to definition and compre-
hension from definition were worse on abstract nouns than on
imageable ones.
This direction of dissociation, with imageable words being
better than abstract ones is evinced not only in aphasia and
semantic dementia, but also in healthy individuals in a wide
range of tasks (Bourassa and Besner, 1994; Walker and Hulme,
1999; see Paivio, 1991 for review). This direction of dissociation
is also seen in various neuropsychological conditions such as deep
dyslexia (Coltheart, 1980), and also in recalling early items in
serial recall tasks, as shown in the performance of patients who
suffer from phonological short term memory limitation (Saffran
and Martin, 1990). This advantage has been generally ascribed to
the assumption that concrete words have richer semantic repre-
sentations (Plaut and Shallice, 1991, 1993; Nickels and Howard,
1995), or that concrete words benefit from having visual features
in addition to their semantic features (Paivio, 1991).
The opposite effect, which we report in the current study, with
better performance on abstract words than on imageable words,
is less frequently reported. However, some patients were reported
to show this direction of effect. Warrington (1975) described AB,
a patient who showed poor picture recognition and picture-word
matching, who had particular difficulty in defining spoken (low
frequency) concrete words, but was better at defining abstract
words. Warrington (1981) reported on CAV, who showed the
same effect in reading, with better reading of abstract words than
of concrete words, and showed considerable difficulty in nam-
ing objects and pictures. Later onWarrington and Shallice (1984)
described SBY, who defined correctly 94% of the (low frequency)
abstract words given to him, but only 50% of the (low frequency)
concrete words. Another very thoroughly-tested case that clearly
demonstrates this dissociation was described by Marshall et al.
(1996). They reported a man with semantic jargon aphasia, RG,
who named and understood abstract words better than image-
able ones, in a list of tests: naming to pictures and to definitions,
word to picture matching, word association, and synonym judg-
ment. A similar pattern of better performance on abstract words
was also reported for a patient with semantic dementia by Breedin
et al. (1994). Their patient, DM, showed abstract word advantage
on a wide range of tasks including word definition and synonym
judgment tasks, as well as in spontaneous speech. Similarly, FB,
reported by Sirigu et al. (1991), produced better definitions of
abstract than of concrete words, produced more items in a ver-
bal fluency task of abstract compared to concrete words, and his
spontaneous speech also showed better production of abstract
words. Yi et al. (2007), who tested semantic dementia partici-
pants showed this pattern for verbs, but not for nouns. They
showed a more severe impairment on motion verbs, which are
more imageable, compared to cognitive verbs, which are related to
psychological mental states. Thus, albeit less common, a selective
impairment in abstract words or concepts is also attested.
Other dissociations that shed light on the organization of the
conceptual-semantic system come from the extensive literature
on category-specific impairments in naming and comprehension,
beyond the concrete-abstract dissociation. These dissociations
have been reported for broad categories such as living versus non-
living concepts or words, and also for more specific semantic
categories, such as fruits and vegetables, animals, musical instru-
ments, tools, body-parts, clothes, and gemstones (see De Bleser,
2009, for review), and double dissociations were also reported.
For example, Warrington and McCarthy (1983, 1987) reported a
dissociation with inferior performance in the production and/or
comprehension of non-living things compared to living things
and Warrington and Shallice (1984) reported the opposite side
of dissociation, with better performance on non-living than on
living items. Warrington and Shallice (1984) suggested that this
double dissociation can be explained by the different semantic
features involved in the semantic representations for living and
non-living items. According to their account, identification of liv-
ing things (e.g., animals) relies more heavily on visual features,
whereas the representation of artifacts critically hinges on their
function. Along these lines of visual-functional distinctions, the
difference in semantic features within the representation of dif-
ferent concepts can also account for further selective deficits. For
example, body parts have very salient functional features, and
hence pattern with non-living entities, whereas the distinction
between gemstones depend on visual features, like living things
(see De Bleser, 2009 for a review).
In the current study we explore, using a long line of tasks
and modalities, the ability of a patient with abstract-imageable
dissociation to name from pictures, objects, definitions, and
from tactile presentation, to understand words and sentences,
to provide a gesture for a picture or a definition, to make lexi-
cal decisions, to repeat and to write to dictation. This extensive
assessment allowed us to point to the specific locus of impair-
ment that gives rise to the pattern he shows, and from there to
learn about the conceptual-semantic system, the way it encode
concepts with visual attributes, the way it encodes motoric infor-
mation, and to shed further light on the effect of various semantic
features in the representation of concepts.
PARTICIPANT
Nissim was a 64 years old right handed man, a native speaker of
Hebrew. He was referred to the clinic following an ischemic left
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sub-acute occipital infarct. Upon arrival at the hospital, he was
diagnosed with severe aphasia and right hemiparesis, right and
left arm apraxia (which improved by the time we tested him),
finger agnosia, dyscalculia, and right hemianopsia. CT revealed,
in addition to the occipital infarct, chronic lacunar left caudate
and right thalamus infarcts. He had 12 years of education, worked
before the stroke as a guard in a children’s day care center, and
had no premorbid language, reading, or writing disorders. He
was diagnosed with severe naming and comprehension deficits
according to the Hebrew version of the WAB (Kertesz, 1982;
Hebrew version by Soroker, 1997). His spontaneous speech was
fluent, with semantic jargon, severe word-finding difficulties
(which we later found out occurred when he searched for an
imageable word), and press of speech. He was unable to read
words.
At the time of the assessment reported below, Nissim was
3 months post his stroke. In spontaneous speech, he could discuss
complex issues using abstract words, but failed to retrieve even
very frequent imageable words. For example, we heard him hold
a detailed conversation about the social risks of unemployment,
where he could develop profound ideas using abstract words.
Yet he failed to convey even the simplest information regarding
what he ate for breakfast, or retrieve the names of his wife and
children. When he described to us his failure to convey mes-
sages and to name objects or pictures, he said “I have become
a person that has no answers. I don’t have my words.” In his
attempts to describe the WAB picture of the picnic scene, he
produced semantic jargon, perseverations, and empty speech: “A
person that is guarding himself or guarding someone else through
language that is here that appears quite clear and he actually he
reads.”
THE PHENOMENON: A DISSOCIATION BETWEEN ABSTRACT
AND IMAGEABLE
To examine the extent of Nissim’s difficulty and the difference
between imageable and abstract words and concepts, to exam-
ine whether the difficulty existed in comprehension as well as
in production, and to find out whether it affects the lexical-
semantic level or the conceptual level, we ran a series of tests of
picture naming, tactile naming, and naming to definition, of word
and sentence comprehension and association tasks, and gesture
production.
PICTURE AND OBJECT NAMING
We tested Nissim’s naming from the visual modality using
picture-naming and object naming tasks.
Method
The picture-naming test (SHEMESH, Biran and Friedmann,
2004) includes 100 pictures of objects of various semantic cat-
egories. Nissim saw the pictures, each presented on a separate
card for an unlimited time and was asked to say the object’s
name. The object names are one to four syllables long, 3–10
phonemes, with ultimate and penultimate stress and with var-
ious first phonemes. The target word frequency as estimated
by a Hebrew corpus encompassing 165,000,000 written words
(Linzen, 2009) was 0.2–485 times per million words (M = 24,
SD= 76). The average performance of adults aged 50–70 without
a language deficit in this test is 96% correct.
The object naming task included 16 daily objects 1–3 syllables
long, 3–10 phonemes, with ultimate and penultimate stress and
with various first phonemes. The target word frequency (Linzen,
2009) was 1–64 times per million words (M= 18, SD= 23).
Results
Nissim could not name any of the pictures. Because of his
extremely poor performance and the deep frustration he ex-
pressed, we stopped the test after 15 pictures (0/15). He also could
not name any of the objects presented to him visually (0/16).
His responses were failed definition attempts, semantic jar-
gon, and perseverations (see examples in Table 1. The examples
throughout this article are translated from Hebrew). There were
only two instances in which he produced definitions that were
relatively good definitions of the objects he attempted to name,
which reflected semantic knowledge of the object.
Interestingly, whereas he made no attempt to use other names
for the objects, and hence made no paraphasias, he was able to
produce some superordinate category names, and to use abstract
words in the definition attempts. The fact that he used superor-
dinate names can be explained by accounts according to which
the basic level of concepts is the highest level that can be imag-
ined. Namely, a superordinate is not related to a single perceptual
image (Rosch et al., 1976; Violi, 2001; Feldman, 2006). Hence, the
name of a superordinate category, which is not related to a visual
image, is easier for Nissim to retrieve.
Table 1 | Examples of Nissim’s picture and object naming.
EXAMPLES OF PICTURE NAMING
Bike A specific time to stroll with it to play with it (correct
gesture of hands holding the bicycle handlebars), a use
that a person would like to do with it hours. Sets the time
to do with it
Coat (Makes the correct gesture). To put it on me. I can adjust
it when I want to put it on me for a specific time that I set
for the weather. Who will be cold and warm for me
Cookies For eating (an appropriate gesture of eating). (exp: What is
it made of?) Vegetable, something spicy that has to do
with the fruit of nature, fruit of the tree
EXAMPLES OF OBJECT NAMING:
Ball This is something. (shows a gesture of catching a ball).
Something accurate, swift, accurate. (shows a gesture of
throwing a ball). Something accurate that can serve him
Knife To put it something for. Or future, something related to
the next stages. (a gesture of cutting with a knife). You
need to hold it on this side (showing)
Screwdriver It is a tool that is working a human being. There is here
the side that holds (pointing to the handle). (a gesture of
holding a screwdriver, without the relevant action)
Comb A tongue/language when one wants to write (a gesture of
hair-combing)
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Importantly, and as demonstrated in Table 1, although he was
not requested to do so, alongside his attempts at the naming task,
Nissim provided 17 correct gestures to the pictures and objects
he failed to name (see Sirigu et al., 1991, for a patient with severe
object identification problems who was still able to demonstrate
object manipulations, and Lhermitte and Beauvois (1973), for a
patient who could not name objects from the visual modality but
correctly mimed their use).
TACTILE NAMING
To further examine the naming deficit and to find out whether it
is specific to naming from the visual modality, we tested Nissim’s
tactile naming.
Method
Seven daily-used objects: a cup, a spoon, a key, a toothbrush, read-
ing glasses, a cap, and a TV remote control were given to Nissim
for tactile naming. Each object was put in Nissim’s left hand (he
was allowed to touch the objects with both hands) while his eyes
were closed. He was requested to touch the object and grope it for
as long as he needed, and then to name it.
Results
Nissim named correctly only one of the seven objects (14%). He
produced five perseverations, for example, instead of naming the
cap he said: “It seems tome like amusical instrument, not music”;
a similar response was given for a tooth brush: “It may be a heavy
musical instrument. . . it is a musical instrument,” reading glasses:
“It can only be a musical instrument,” and a remote control:
“This is music. . . it can be a musical instrument.” In addition he
attempted to produce definitions for the target items but he man-
aged to produce a partially relevant paraphrase only for a cup:
“That we drink in a specific holiday something that belongs to a
hot Passover.” It is worth mentioning that this task immediately
followed a task in which he was requested to list as many holidays
as he could in 1min and then to list as many musical instruments
in 1min, so this is where the perseverations came from.
We already had a clue that Nissim’s difficulty was not limited
to naming from the visual modality, as he had imageable word
finding difficulties also in spontaneous speech. The tactile naming
task further stresses this conclusion, as Nissim showed very poor
naming from the tactile modality as well.
In marked contrast with his inability to name the objects, he
provided appropriate gestures to each of the seven objects he
held. (He provided these gestures although he was not requested
to do so). Even given the relatively small number of items in
this task, the difference between his naming (1/7) and gestur-
ing (7/7) was significant (using a McNemar test), p = 0.03. This,
and his good spontaneous gesturing in the picture naming task,
suggest that the information he gains from the object is enough
to access the correct concept and to activate the gestural infor-
mation in the concept that would then activate the correct entry
in the praxicon.
NAMING TO DEFINITION: ABSTRACT AND IMAGEABLE CONCEPTS
So far Nissim’s naming was found to be severely impaired in visual
and tactile presentations. To evaluate Nissim’s ability to produce
abstract words and to compare abstract and imageable words,
this experiment tested his naming to definition of high and low
imageability concepts.
Method
The test included definitions for 120 target items, 70 low image-
ability target words and 50 high imageability target words. We
read to Nissim a definition of a word (a noun or an adjective)
and he was requested to orally produce the word. For example,
definitions for high-imageability concepts included: A tool used
for cutting bread; What does the hen lay?, and the definitions for
the low-imageability words included What is information that is
whispered in the ear and is not for distribution?; Assets that are
left by someone after he passed away. The definitions of the high
and low imageability target words were presented together, in
random order. Most of the definitions provided for the target
imageable words included an imageable word (40/50) andmost of
the definitions for the abstract words were abstract (66/70). The
target high and the low imageability words did not differ with
respect to frequency (Hebrew frequency database, Linzen, 2009;
p = 0.26).
Results
Nissim named correctly 56/70 (80%) of the low imageability
words, but only 24/50 (48%) of the high imageability words.
His naming of the low imageability words was significantly bet-
ter than his naming of the high imageability ones, χ2 = 13.44,
p = 0.0002. For example, he easily named inheritance, elections,
and advertising, while failing to name imageable words such as
carrot, necklace, or chocolate.
Analysis of the naming errors reveals that for the high
imageability target words he produced 13 semantic paraphasias,
9 perseverations, 3 attempted definitions, 2 correct gestures that
indicated that he accessed the concept, 2 partially correct gestures,
and one incorrect gesture. In addition there were 3 (10%) correct
but delayed responses. He made no phonological errors.
Analysis of the errors Nissimmade for the low imageability tar-
get words reveals that he produced 4 semantic paraphasias, 3 rep-
etitions of words from the question, 2 “don’t know” responses,
and 5 consecutive responses in which he was requested to pro-
vide the opposite of a word and instead he explained the word the
experimenter said. Here, too, he made no phonological errors.
Interestingly, he did not have perseverative responses when
he tried to retrieve the abstract words, indicating that the perse-
verations are entering a void left by words that do not activate
an entry in the semantic lexicon. Table 2 presents examples of
responses that he produced for definitions of imageable and
abstract concepts.1
1Interestingly, when one talks about “imageability” it is unclear which sen-
sory modalities enter this definition. Most of our investigation involved the
visual modality. We only touched this point by asking Nissim to name to
definition two concepts with auditory attributes (what appears after the light-
ning? Which sound does a dog make?) and three tastes (what is the taste of
sugar/lemon/Bamba). He succeeded in both auditorily-related names, and in
2 of the 3 tastes. (For the taste of Bamba, a Israeli peanut-based snack, he said
“Blue, sweet, no. . . reddish mint?”, possibly failing because the target word
given to him was highly visually imageable). These are too few items to make a
solid conclusion but theymay be carefully taken to suggest that Nissim’s deficit
was specifically related to visual attributes, rather than to general sensory ones.
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Table 2 | Examples of Nissim’s responses in the naming to definition
task: high and low imageability words.
Definition provided Nissim’s response
HIGH IMAGEABLITY WORDS
What do we wear on our feet? A coat
What is the color of a cucumber? White, black? Green
An orange vegetable that rabbits eat A tangerine. I know what you
mean, you mean a tall-statured
vegetable
A sweet made of cacao, with milk or
bitter flavors
Honey
The desert animal It goes up in two phases, it has
some phases
The shape of the ball (Nissim drew a circle with his
finger but made no verbal
response)
The color of snow Pink
An animal with a long neck A snake, no, it raises its head
A traditional Hanukkah toy (a dreidel) A giraffe? (this item appeared
immediately after the
experimenter told Nissim the
correct name of “an animal with a
long neck”)
LOW IMAGEABLITY WORDS
The eldest son in a family Firstborn
Arrives to a visit in a foreign country Tourist
Information that is whispered in the
ear and is not meant for further
distribution
Secret
An imaginary story that one sees
during sleep
Dream
A person who has a lot of money Rich
A situation in which a person does
not eat or drink, such as in Yom
Kippur
Fasting
A song that represents a country Hymn
Another analysis we have done related to the effect of oper-
ativity on Nissim’s naming of imageable words. Concepts are
defined as operative if they can be readily grasped, manip-
ulated, and operated upon. Whereas some studies reported
that operativity played a crucial role in participants’ per-
formance (Gardner, 1973; Howard et al., 1995; Nickels and
Howard, 1995), Nissim showed no such effect (χ2 = 0.64,
p = 0.42): he had 10/18 correct responses on operative
concepts (which included mainly tools and kitchenware),
and 14/32 correct on non-operative imageable concepts
(such as the sun, or a giraffe).
NAMING HIGH AND LOW IMAGEABILITY PROPER NAMES: NAMING
TO DEFINITION
The naming to definition test revealed a clear imageability effect
in Nissim’s naming, with better naming of low imageability
words. The next test examined the imageability effect within
one category: proper names. All the target words in this task
were proper names, but some of the proper names were of
people that are closely tied to a visual image, and others were
names of people without a visual image (figures from the bible,
for example). Some of the names in the two categories were
the same name, which appeared once in the abstract condition
(Moshe Rabenu, Moses) and once in the visual-image condition
(Moshe Dayan).
Method
We orally presented to Nissim 31 descriptions of people, and he
was asked to retrieve a name for each description. All the names
were names of familiar people: well known politicians, actors,
football players, singers, figures from the bible andNissim’s family
members. Of the target proper names, 17 were people that are well
known by their image, because they appeared in electronic and
written media, or known specifically to Nissim because they are
his family members. The 14 other proper names were names that
are very familiar but are not connected to a visual image. The list
of famous “imageable” people consisted of political leaders (such
as the first Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion), Nissim’s
family members (wife and children), and famous football players2
(Maradona, Pelé). The list of the familiar “non-imageable” peo-
ple consisted of biblical figures (such as Abraham and King
David) and famous Israeli early twentieth century poets. The
descriptions did not include any visual properties of the person
described.
Results
Nissim named the low imageability names (10/14, 71%) signif-
icantly better than he named the high imageability ones (6/17,
35%), χ2 = 4.01, p = 0.045. Whereas he could name Moshe, the
biblicalMoses who does not have a visual image related to him (at
least not in Judaism, where religious figures are rarely depicted),
he failed to name Moshe Dayan, a well known Defense Minister
and Foreign Minister of Israel, who was very tightly connected
with a well-defined visual image, which included an eye patch.
Whereas he could name Isaac, the son of biblical Abraham, he
could not retrieve the names of his own sons.
Nissim’s incorrect responses for the high imageability proper
names included 4 definitions, two of which did not convey
any accurate information, 4 “don’t know” responses, 3 seman-
tic paraphasias, and one perseveration. As for the low image-
ability proper names there were 2 “don’t know” responses, 2
definitions, and one correct but delayed response (see Table 3
for examples).
2Nissim’s primary hobby was sports and he was particularly very knowledge-
able about football players history.
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Table 3 | Examples of Nissim’s responses in the naming to definition
task: high and low imageability proper names.
DEFINITIONS OF HI PROPER RESPONSE
NAMES
The current defense minister (Ehud
Barak)
A man a bit younger than me
(demonstrates with his hand his
height) very famous, was the
father of the daughter . . . . not
Ez. . . .
Nissim’s elder son (Yoram) He lives at my house every day
Nissim’s second son (Avi) I have three, one was my eldest
son, i.. my daughter. . . he was in a
high rank. . . Ran?
The current prime minister
(Binyamin Netanyahu)
Begin (a former prime minister). . .
Peres (the current president). . .
Eshkol (a former prime minister)
The defense minister during Yom
Kippur war, who was also a chief of
staff and a minister of foreign
affairs, an amateur archaeologist,
and a women lover. (Moshe Dayan)
David?
DEFINITIONS OF LI PROPER RESPONSE
NAMES
The female poet who wrote the
song about the lake of Galilee, who
died of Tuberculosis. (Rachel)
Rachel
The Hebrew leader of the Egypt
Exodus (Moses)
Moses. . . Pharaoh. . . Moses
PICTURE NAMING: PROPER NAMES
We also tested Nissim’s production of proper names using
a picture naming task. Naturally, in this test all target
people were easily identifiable by their picture, and hence,
imageable.
Method
Nine color pictures of famous people, 7 politicians (for example
Bill Clinton) and 2 famous singers (Elvis Presley) were introduced
for naming.
Results
Nissim could not name any of the pictures (0/9 correct). He
produced only one name, which was incorrect (naming the
picture of Elvis Presley “Shimon Peres,” the Israeli president).
For each of the pictures he attempted to provide seman-
tic information about the person in the picture, but none
of these definitions was accurate. For two of the pictures
he produced some relevant information. For example, when
he saw the picture of Elvis Presley he said: “Peri.. Peri. . .
Shimon Peres. . . he was the leader number one. . . he will
last for a long time on top of the calibers of the type of
music.”
COMPREHENSION OF IMAGEABLE WORDS: WORD-PICTURE
MATCHING
The previous tests clearly indicated Nissim’s severe deficit in the
production of imageable words. We now assessed whether the
same deficit applies to his word comprehension.
Method
Auditory comprehension was tested using a spoken word to
object/picture matching task, taken from the Hebrew version
of the WAB (Kertesz, 1982; Hebrew version by Soroker, 1997).
This subtest includes five 6-item sets (real objects, pictures
of the same objects, letters, numbers, and colors). Nissim
heard a word that matched one of the six pictures/objects in
the set, and was requested to point to the matching picture/
object.
Results
Nissim performed only 5/30 correct on this test, where the guess-
ing pattern distributes around 5/30. Namely, he showed a guess-
ing pattern. His performance in each category was at or just below
chance level: 3/6 correct in real objects, 1/6 correct in the pictures
of the same objects, 1/6 correct in the color category, and 0/6 in
the letters and numbers sets.
COMPREHENSION OF HIGH AND LOW IMAGEABILITY WORDS: WORD
ASSOCIATION TASK
To compare between Nissim’s comprehension of high and low
imageablity words, we administered a word association task.
Nissim heard triads of words: a target word and two other words,
and was requested to choose which of the two words is seman-
tically related to the target word. For example: “What relates to
shoes, hands or feet?” He was asked to say the word (feet) or to
say “The first word/the second word.”
Method
The test used the MA KASHUR word association task (Biran and
Friedmann, 2007b), to which we added six triads. In total, the task
included 39 triads of words, 27 triads of high imageability words,
and 12 triads of abstract words. For example: imageable triads:
shoes—hands/feet; cow—milk/coke. Abstract triads: honesty—
truth/lie; Education—enlightenment/primitiveness. The target
high and low imageability words did not differ in frequency
[t(37) = 0.61, p = 0.55], based on Linzen (2009) Hebrew fre-
quency database.
Results
Similarly to the high/low imageability dissociation in produc-
tion, in this task too, Nissim performed significantly better on
the low-imageability words, with 12/12 (100%) items correct,
than in the high imageability sets, in which he was correct
only on 20/27 (74%) of the items, χ2 = 3.79, p = 0.05. For
example, he incorrectly chose the word bag (rather than pil-
low) as related to bed, and chose a door (instead of window)
as related to curtain. However he correctly associated the word
crime to prison and not to award and time to seconds and not to
kilos.
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COMPREHENSION OF HIGH IMAGEABILITY WORDS: A SURPRISING
DISSOCIATION BETWEEN OBJECTS AND BODY PARTS
Comprehension of high imageability words within sentences
Another way to assess Nissim’s comprehension of words was to
test high imageability words within sentences. This was evalu-
ated through the analysis of his performance in the Sequential
Commands subtest of the WAB.
Method
The 11 commands in this subtest include 20 imageable nouns:
18 names of objects in the room (“Point to the chair”) and
2 body parts (“Raise your hand”). We examined for each of the
nouns whether Nissim was able to identify it (by manipulating
the relevant object) or not.
Results
Nissim, again, showed very poor comprehension of the objects,
and did not perform correctly any of the 9 commands that
included an object. However, surprisingly, he performed well on
the two commands that involved his body parts—his hand and
his eyes.
Comprehension of names of body parts
To further explore this relatively preserved comprehension of the
names of his body parts, we used the body parts and the right/left
body parts subtests of the auditory comprehension WAB test, in
which Nissim was requested to point to 9 of his body parts when
he heard their names (point to your ear, nose, eye, stomach, neck,
chin, nails, palm of the hand, arm), and then 7 body parts for
which we also specified the side (your right ear, right shoulder,
left knee, left ankle, right hip, left elbow, right cheek).
Results
Whereas, as reported in the Word-Picture Matching Section,
Nissim performed at chance level with objects and pictures in
the auditory comprehension task, he performed relatively well
when the task required him to point to his own body parts (15/16
correct), and his performance on the body parts was signifi-
cantly better than his performance on the objects and pictures,
χ2 = 30.73, p < 0.0001.3
A possible explanation for Nissim’s better performance with
pointing to his body parts is that his body parts are encoded
proprioceptively, and not visually. Sadly, we did not test his
comprehension of pictures of body parts to examine this
hypothesis.
3He did, however, make three left/right errors when he was required to point
to a body part on a specific side of his body. Although right/left disorientation
is a primary symptom of Gerstmann’s syndrome (Wilkins and Brody, 1971;
Mayer et al., 1999; Roux et al., 2003), and he also showed dysgraphia and finger
agnosia, which are characteristic of this syndrome, we do not think he should
be diagnosed with this syndrome: a. His finger agnosia, or rather, his inability
to name fingers, was probably part of his general inability to name concrete
objects. b. Pure cases of Gerstmann’s syndrome do not show any difficulty in
language other than the inability to name fingers and numbers (Roeltgen et al.,
1983; Cipolotti et al., 1991; Mayer et al., 1999; Rusconi et al., 2010), which is
clearly not the case for Nissim, who had vast problems in spontaneous speech
and in naming of all kinds of objects in various tasks. c. Gerstmann’s syndrome
is typically a result of a parietal damage (Rusconi et al., 2010), but Nissim had
an occipital damage.
COMPREHENSION OF HIGH AND LOW IMAGEABILITY SENTENCES:
SENTENCE VERIFICATION TASK
To evaluate Nissim’s comprehension beyond the word level, we
tested his sentence comprehension using the sentence verification
task of the WAB.
Method
The task involved 8 sentences that include high imageability
words, such as: Is the door closed? And 9 items that included
only low imageability words, such as: Does March precede June?
Nissim heard each sentence and answered the question.
Results
As in the single word level, in the sentence level, too, Nissim
showed a clear dissociation between sentences with high and low
imageability words.Whereas he performed at ceiling (9/9 correct)
on the low imageability sentences, he performed poorly and at
chance level on the high imageability ones (5/8) with a significant
difference between the conditions, χ2 = 4.1, p = 0.04.
COMPREHENSION OF COMPLEX ABSTRACT CONCEPTS:
INTERPRETATION OF PROVERBS
The single word comprehension tests indicated that Nissim is
not only impaired in the production of imageable words, he
also struggles with the comprehension of imageable words. The
sentence comprehension task showed that he also fails to under-
stand simple sentences that involve imageable words, whereas he
comprehends simple abstract sentences well.
In the next experiment we went beyond the single word level
and the simple sentence level, and assessed Nissim’s compre-
hension of proverbs. We selected proverbs for which the literal
meaning is highly imageable, both because they include imageable
words and because the literal meaning of the phrase or sentence
as a whole is imageable. The meaning of the proverb, i.e., its fig-
urative meaning was, however, abstract. This allowed us to test
whether he could reach the abstract interpretation even when
the literal meaning is highly imageable. This would enable us
to examine whether the inability of Nissim, based on the find-
ings so far, to extract the imageable, literal reading of the proverb
blocks him from extracting the abstract figurative meaning of the
proverb. Beyond telling us something about Nissim’s impairment,
it would also assist in a long-standing discussion in the literature
of proverb comprehension: do we have to pass through the literal
meaning to access the figurative one?
Method
The task included 13 proverbs, which were auditorily presented
one by one. We selected proverbs for which the literal meaning
was highly visually imageable, but their figurative proverb inter-
pretation was abstract. After hearing each proverb Nissim was
requested to explain the proverb’s meaning in his own words.
Results
Nissim correctly described the meaning of 10/13 proverbs (77%,
see Table 4 for examples). In four of these proverbs he correctly
explained the proverb after it was put in a sentence. Interestingly,
even in the three proverbs he did not explain correctly, he never
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Table 4 | Examples of Nissim’s proverb explanation.
Proverb Nissim’s explanation
A broken reed A person that is trusted to be about to
help and save the situation but it turns
out that he is a broken reed. It is a belief
in something. He let down, he does
less than he could do. He was relied
upon more than he can help,
economically or physically. He was
trusted more. . . “What an asset there is
here,” but there is nothing
(Danni entered) Like a stormy
wind
He went inside very quickly, went
quicker than he had planned, went in a
way of ecstasy, nerves, stressed. More
unrelaxed than he should have been
Jumped higher than his navel Did more than he thought he needs to,
jumped above his ability
Stood on his hind legs He insisted
(Yossi is Moshe’s) right hand It means that he will stand by him
physically, safety-wise, emotionally. He
is his right hand, he stands by him
provided an interpretation that was based on the literal meaning
of the proverbs. Rather, in these cases he produced vague general
responses for which we could not be sure that he interpreted the
proverb correctly.
Interim discussion: theoretical implications of proverb com-
prehension. These results shed light on a discussion regarding
the process of access to the figurative meaning of proverbs
(Temple and Honeck, 1999; Keysar et al., 2000). At this point in
the study we can already safely conclude that Nissim cannot access
visual aspects of concepts. His good performance in the com-
prehension of proverbs suggests that it is not necessary to go
through the literal meaning of the proverb, which in this case
was rich in visual features, in order to access the figurative mean-
ing. In a way, his extreme difficulty in accessing words that had
visual attributes, even if it seemed that he had enough infor-
mation to access them without the visual attributes, suggests
that the visual attributes block his word access. Thus, his good
comprehension of proverbs might suggest something stronger
than that the figurative comprehension meaning can be accessed
without accessing the literal one. It might suggest that some
inhibition on the literal meaning is active in normal interpreta-
tion of proverbs, which allowed Nissim to access their meanings
correctly.
DESCRIBING PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF FAMOUS PEOPLE
The tests up to now indicate that Nissim has tremendous dif-
ficulty in accessing words and proper names for concepts that
include visual attributes. He also found it difficult to fully under-
stand words that include visual attributes. We next tested his
ability to describe visual attributes of people, when given their
names.
Method
We said the names of 7 famous political leaders, and Nissim
was requested to describe how they look. All of these people
have a typical visual feature. For example Theodor Herzl (father
of modern political Zionism) had a full, medium-long black
beard; Moshe Dayan, a past Israeli Defense Minister and Foreign
Minister, was well-known for his eye patch.
Results
Whereas none of Nissim’s verbal descriptions were accurate, four
gestures, for two of the people, conveyed relevant information
about the person he was describing. This suggests that the ges-
tures have better access not only to motor-gestural information
about concepts but also to some visual information. For exam-
ple, for Moshe Dayan, he showed, with his hand, an eye patch
on his eye, but said “in one leg he had no hair in the right
leg. A person without hair.” and showed an eye patch again
with his hand. In other cases he knew what the characteris-
tic dimension of the person was, but could not decide where
the person was on this dimension (in a way similar to his abil-
ity to name the superordinate categories of objects he could
not name). For example, when asked to describe Napoleon,
he could say that his dominant visual feature was his height,
but then continued to say “wasn’t he the tallest person in
the world?”. When asked to describe Barack Obama, he said:
“Hair? color? In the face maybe? A color a bit darker than
usual?”
This difficulty may be attributable either to difficulty in fully
accessing the concept from the semantic lexicon, to a difficulty in
the visual features in the conceptual system.
WHAT IS THE LOCUS OF THE DEFICIT?
The next step is to try and further focus on the locus of
deficit that gives rise to Nissim’s selective pattern of impair-
ment. We assume a multi-stage model of lexical processing,
schematically shown in Figure 1. For production, the first stage
is the conceptual stage, in which a non-verbal message is cre-
ated (possibly after the identification of an object, in case of
object naming), followed by access to the appropriate entry in
the semantic lexicon that includes words organized semanti-
cally, and then a phonological lexicon that holds phonological
information about the word, and a phonological output buffer
(Butterworth, 1989; Levelt et al., 1999; Nickels, 2001, 2002;
Friedmann et al., 2013). For the input route we assume a phono-
logical input buffer after the first auditory stages, which is fol-
lowed by a phonological input lexicon, and then the semantic lex-
icon and the conceptual system, which are shared with the output
process.
At this point we know that Nissim had difficulties in the
production of imageable words from visual and tactile presen-
tation of objects, from definitions, and in spontaneous speech,
as well as in the comprehension of imageable words. We will
now examine whether the visual processing is impaired and
whether it can be the source of his difficulty, and then move to
examine the various lexical and conceptual stages of word pro-
cessing and find the component that is responsible for his pattern
of impairment.
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FIGURE 1 | Lexical processing model.
VISUAL AGNOSIA? A TEST OF VISUAL PERCEPTION
We already saw in the previous experiments that Nissim’s impair-
ment could not be ascribed solely to a deficit in visual processing,
as he made errors in tactile naming, naming to definition, and
spontaneous speech, which do not involve visual perception.
To further examine whether the failure to name from the visual
modality may be ascribed to visual agnosia, we tested Nissim’s
visual perception.
Method
We administered the visual perception subtests in the LOTCA
(Loewenstein Occupational Therapy Cognitive Assessment, Katz
et al., 1989). This test examines visual discrimination, visual
memory, visual-spatial relationships, visual form constancy,
visual sequential memory, visual figure-ground, and visual clo-
sure.
Results
Nissim performed flawlessly on the LOTCA’s visual perception
subtests, reaching the maximum score in each of the subtests.
This good performance indicates that his impaired performance
in the picture and object naming tests and in the spoken word
to object/picture matching task cannot be ascribed to a visual
perception deficit.
PHONOLOGICAL INPUT AND OUTPUT ABILITIES: AUDITORY LEXICAL
DECISION, WORD AND SENTENCE REPETITION, ANDWRITING TO
DICTATION
Given Nissim’s poor word production and comprehension, we
evaluated his input and output phonological lexicons and buffers.
We did so using an auditory lexical decision task, word, word
sequence, and sentence repetition tasks, and writing to dictation.
Nissim’s auditory lexical decision, assessed using PALPA 5/1
(Kay et al., 1992; Hebrew version by Gil and Edelstein, 1999) was
very good. He performed 100% correct in this task (46/46), indi-
cating that his phonological input lexicon was spared, and so was
the path to it from auditory presentation (auditory perception,
phonological input buffer).
His repetition of single words and sentences in the WAB (six
1–3 syllable high-imageablity single words and nine phrases and
sentences of 2–10 words) was also good (with a final score of
92/100). He also repeated well 6 sequences of two unrelated
2-syllable words and eight sequences of three 2-syllable words
(FriGvi, Friedmann and Gvion, 2002; Gvion and Friedmann,
2012). This supports the previous conclusion that his input
phonological buffer and lexicon are spared, and further indi-
cates that his phonological output buffer was spared, and given
that he repeated well sentences that included up to 10 words, his
phonological output lexicon is probably also spared, supporting
the repetition of this large amount of phonemes.
Importantly, his repetition of imageable words, as single words
and within sentences, was spared, indicating that he can retrieve
imageable words from the phonological output lexicon, and the
deficit in naming of imageable words lies in an earlier stage of the
process, in the conceptual of lexical-semantic stages. This finding
can also shed light on the repetition process, showing that it can
proceed without going through the conceptual system.
The effects on his naming also pointed in the same direction
of intact phonological stages: whereas he showed a very strong
imageability effect as we saw before, he showed no length effect
(with 20%, 16%, 30%, 33%, 25% correct performance in 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 andmore letter words, respectively), excluding the phonological
output buffer as the source of his impairment. He also showed no
frequency effect (χ2 = 0.02, p = 0.09), ruling out a phonological
output lexicon impairment.
A further instantiation of Nissim’s preserved input phono-
logical lexicon is his good writing to dictation. We dictated
to Nissim 52 words (from the TILTAN writing screening task,
Friedmann et al., 2007). He showed some errors that are mainly
attributable to incorrect allograph selection (15 errors), 6 let-
ter omission/migration that are typical for graphemic output
buffer deficits (Yachini and Friedmann, 2009), and 4 sublexical
writing errors (surface dysgraphia-like errors). However, impor-
tantly, he did not make errors in writing that even slightly
resembled his difficulties in oral naming. There were 33 image-
able words in this tasks, and he wrote all of them. This indi-
cates, again, that his phonological input buffer and lexicon
are intact. 4 Given the pattern of Nissim’s poor access to the
semantic lexicon of imageable words, this indicates that he does
not go through the conceptual-semantic system in writing to
dictation.
A CONCEPTUAL DEFICIT? PICTURE ASSOCIATION TASK
Given Nissim’s relatively good performance in the visual tasks, his
impaired imageable word production and comprehension, and
4As for the implication of his performance in this task about the status of
the phonological output lexicon—this depends on the path one assumes for
spelling to dictation: if the input arrives to the orthographic output lexicon
directly from the phonological input lexicon, then this finding has no bear-
ing as to the phonological output lexicon. If, however, the information goes
from the phonological input lexicon via the phonological output lexicon to
the orthographic output lexicon, then his writing performance also supports
the conclusion that his phonological output lexicon is intact.
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his spared phonological input and output buffers and lexicons,
two possible loci in the model remain that could give rise to his
pattern of deficit: the conceptual system or the semantic lexicon
(or the connection between them). To explore this question and
decide between these two possibilities, we examined Nissim’s con-
ceptual abilities in a picture task that did not involve words and
hence, did not involve the semantic lexicon, only the conceptual
system.
Method
Nissim’s conceptual ability was tested using a picture associa-
tion task (MA KASHUR, Biran and Friedmann, 2007a). This
task includes 35 triads of colored pictures. Each triad included
a top picture, and a pair of pictures below it, from which he was
requested to choose the picture that was semantically related to
the top picture. For example, he saw a picture of a glove, and had
to choose between a hand and a foot; or a picture of bread, and
underneath it a knife and scissors. The foil in all triads was related
visually or semantically to the other picture but not to the top one.
Results
Nissim performed 23/35 (71%) correct, a performance that is
not significantly different from chance, using the binomial dis-
tribution. Furthermore, even when he made a correct choice he
frequently hesitated and commented that he does not know or
is unsure that this is indeed the correct picture. This indicates a
deficit in Nissim’s ability to associate two pictures on the basis of
conceptual knowledge. Namely, even when no words are involved,
the difficulty is already present, indicating that that the deficit lies
in the early stage of the concept itself, prior to the access to its
verbal representation in the semantic lexicon.
The comparison of his performance in this test to the parallel
word association task (of imageable items) reported earlier indi-
cated a similar and poor performance (71% vs. 74%, χ2 = 0.50,
p = 0.48) in the picture and word tasks. This further points to
the conceptual system as the source for Nissim’s deficit. Had the
deficit been located at the semantic lexicon or in the access to
it from the conceptual system, we would have expected Nissim’s
performance on the picture association task to be good, and bet-
ter than in the word association task. (Individuals with a semantic
lexicon impairment perform well on this test that involves only
pictures, and fail on the parallel word association test, see for
example Biran and Friedmann, 2012).
Thus, all these considerations point to a selective deficit in the
conceptual system that affects imageable concepts, and specifi-
cally the visual attributes within imageable concepts.
DISCUSSION
This case study showed a clear pattern of dissociation between
abstract and imageable concepts. The participant was unable to
retrieve words for imageable concepts in a variety of tasks: picture
naming, object naming, naming to definition and tactile naming.
He also failed in understanding imageable words. His deficit was
also evident in a test in which he was requested to find semantic
associations between pictures. When trying to retrieve image-
able words, he made attempts at definitions, which were often
incorrect, some semantic paraphasias, and many perseverations.
In contrast, his production and comprehension of abstract words
were relatively good, and did not give rise to perseverations. His
ability to perform gestures for pictures and objects was much bet-
ter preserved than his retrieval of the names of the same objects.
Additional tests indicated that his visual perception, as well as his
phonological input and output lexicons and phonological input
and output buffers were intact.
This pattern of impairment and sparing indicates that Nissim’s
deficit lies in a selective impairment in the conceptual system.
The picture that emerges from his performance suggests that con-
cepts in the conceptual system are multi-faceted. A concept of an
object, for example, includes its visual attributes, semantic fea-
tures, functional features, and motoric-gestural information (see
for example Shallice, 1988 and his discussion there of Allport,
1985). We suggest that Nissim’s impairment lies in the visual
properties within each concept. As a result, Nissim is often able
to roughly access the relevant concept from a picture, from seeing
or touching an object, or from a definition, in a way that pro-
vides him with enough information to access the motor features
of the object, and retrieve the relevant gesture from the praxicon,
but the information contained in the concept is not enough for
him to access the entry in the semantic lexicon, or, in the other
direction, to access the relevant concept from the semantic lexi-
con. Notice that we do not talk here about “richness of concepts,”
as has been, for example, suggested by Franklin et al. (1995) and
Nickels and Howard (1995) for the superior access to imageable
concepts for some patients. Had it been simply a matter of rich-
ness of concepts, we would expect Nissim to be able to access the
names, for example, of his sons, for whom he no doubt has a rich
semantic representation. Instead, we suggest that it is the impair-
ment of the visual features in the concepts that hinder the access
to the name in the semantic lexicon.
One can think about Nissim’s inability to access the seman-
tic lexicon from the conceptual system as a case of insufficient
information, or as a case of blocking, in which the inability to
access the visual information is blocking further lexical access.
The absence of phonological errors and his good performance
in auditory lexical decision, in word and sentence repetition,
and in writing to dictation show that his phonological lexicons
and buffers are intact, and point to the conceptual system and,
specifically to the visual attributes within the concepts as the
source of his deficit (See Figure 1). For concepts without visual
attributes, the processing of the concept in the conceptual system
and the access from it to the semantic lexicon are more success-
ful, because the information in the concept suffices to access the
lexical entry (under the no-sufficient-visual-information expla-
nation), or because no blocking occurs, as access to visual infor-
mation is not required. The results also suggest that the visual
attributes of the concept are not required for retrieving the
appropriate gesture from the output praxicon, where the physi-
cal attributes of familiar gestures, such as their kinetic parameters,
are stored and activated (Gonzalez Rothi et al., 1991; Heilman and
Gonzalez Rothi, 1993). This would explain the good pantomime
that Nissim was able to present when he failed to retrieve a name
of an object.
This explanation follows in the footsteps of several researchers
who accounted for various selective naming impairments in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 226 | 10
Gvion and Friedmann Deficit in imageable concepts
terms of the semantic features in the representation of concepts,
such asWarrington and Shallice (1984); Franklin et al. (1995) and
Nickels and Howard (1995). We do not assume (or exclude) here
separate modality-specific semantic systems (see discussions for
and against modality-specific semantic systems in Shallice, 1987,
1988; Caramazza et al., 1990; Hillis et al., 1990) but rather discuss
the features internal to the each concept within the conceptual
system.
The dissociation between concepts with and without visual
attributes applied both for objects and for proper names. Just
like in other nouns and adjectives, Nissim was able to retrieve
names of people who are not related to a visual image, but failed
to retrieve names of people who are tied to a visual image. The
case of proper names is especially interesting because, unlike other
nouns, the exact same proper name can be related to a person
whose visual image is part of his concept (like Abraham Lincoln),
and to a person with no visual image (the biblical Abraham). The
finding that Nissim showed the same abstract-imageable disso-
ciation in proper names suggests that the conceptual storage of
person information is similar to the one described above: some
people are stored with visual attributes, in which case Nissim fails
to retrieve their names or appropriate information about them,
whereas others, biblical figures for example, are stored without
visual properties, and hence are accessed more easily by Nissim.
Another result that has interesting theoretical bearing is
Nissim’s good comprehension of abstract proverbs for which the
literal meaning is highly imageable. Researchers of the process
of access to proverbs’ figurative meaning debate as to whether
access to the figurative meaning is obligatorily preceded by a
stage of access to the literal meaning of the concept (Temple
and Honeck, 1999; Keysar et al., 2000). Nissim’s good compre-
hension of proverbs with highly imageable literal meanings is
thus very informative in this debate. Given that Nissim cannot
access imageable concepts from words, his good comprehen-
sion of the figurative meaning of proverbs suggests that he did
not go through a phase of accessing the literal meaning of the
proverbs. More generally, this may suggest that it is not necessary
to go through the literal meaning in order to access the figurative
meaning of proverbs. According to a blocking account of his per-
formance, i.e., that the existence of a visual image in the concept
actually blocks further processing, the results might even suggest
that the figurative meaning of proverbs involves inhibition of the
literal meaning, which explains how comeNissimwas not blocked
in accessing the figurative meaning of the proverbs.
Another interesting point relates to the source of
perseverations. Whereas Nissim’s speech was replete with
perseverations when he tried to retrieve imageable words, he
had no or almost no perseverations when the target had no visual
attributes. A similar tendency for perseverations when the target
words are imageable seems to characterize also the error exam-
ples Warrington and Shallice (1984, p. 842) provided from SBY
attempts to define highly imageable words. This suggests that the
origin of the perseverations can be the attempt to produce out-
put when no entry in the semantic lexicon is activated. In this
case, the semantic lexicon does not pass on information to the
phonological output lexicon so a word that is left activated from
previous production in the phonological output lexicon is used
instead.
Finally, previous studies described optic aphasia, a deficit in
which the patient cannot name visually presented objects, but
is able to identify them correctly by sight and to name them
when they are presented in another sensory modality (Lhermitte
and Beauvois, 1973; Beauvois, 1982; Davidoff and de Bleser,
1993; Luzzatti et al., 1998; Luzzatti, 2003). Whereas, similarly to
cases of optic aphasia, Nissim was unable to name visually pre-
sented objects, his impairment clearly differed from optic aphasia.
Beauvois (1982) clearly defines optic aphasia, and determines that
the naming impairment in optic aphasia is specific to the visual
modality. According to her the term “optic aphasia” is appropri-
ate only for cases of normal language abilities, without anomia
in speech production, and with normal spontaneous speech (as
was the case with the patient reported in Lhermitte and Beauvois,
1973, for example). Because Nissim showed the same difficulty
in concrete words in spontaneous speech, as well as in naming to
definition and naming of tactilely presented objects, the diagnosis
of optic aphasia does not seem to apply to him.5
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